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To Who It May Concern: 
I apologize for the excessive number of typographical errors found 
in this paper. While no one but myself is to blame for this lack of 
scholarly effort, I think that there is an irony here which deserves comment. 
It is only fitting that my own research is marred by numerous 
imperfections, for the process with which I was forced to comply was also 
marred by imperfection. In each case, these imperfections are inexcusable. 
Starting with an ill-defined and poorly understood objective--
the completion of an 11 interdisciplinary 11 honors thesis--the Proudian Inter-
disciplinary Honors Program lacks both direction and, I am sorry to say, 
meaning. The puropse of even writing an interdisciplinary thesis is lost 
when no one, faculty and students included, can agree on what interdisciplin-
ary studies actually is. This lack of consensus, as well as confusion as 
to the difference between "multidisciplinary" and "interdisciplinary", 
merely makes one question if it is possible for any undergraduate student 
to complete an authentically interdisciplinary thesis. 
While I have learned a great deal in researching and writing my 
thesis, it is revealing that I could have completed (and probably would 
have) this exact same thesis without participating in the Proudian Program. 
But in trying to fit my own thesis into the "interdisciplinary mold, 11 the 
confusion of everyone involved and the downright pettiness and egotistic pride 
of certain faculty members only detracted from the experience. The fact 
that this thesis, marred with so many typographical errors, was accepted as 
the final draft without being retyped is not only embarrassing for me personally, 
but best portrays the hypocracy of the process through which it was finally 
approved. 
Although this statement is undoubtedly somewhat self-serving, I 
only wish to emphasize the necessity of rethinking the entire concept of in-
terdisciplinary studies and the Proudian Honors Program in particular. I hope 
that others can learn from my own experiences and define the Proudian Program 
so that it can achieve its as yet unrealized potential to provide a truly 
exceptional undergraduate experience. 
Sincerely~ 
I. Introduction 
Given the difficulty of explicitly defining the "national 
interest" of any country, it has been fashionable for political 
scientists, especially since the Russian revolution of 1917, to 
assert that formal ideology is the prime motivation force in a 
country's foreign policy, especially if that country is a major 
actor in world politics. For example, it is often argued that 
capitalist countries will behave in a fashion clearly distin-
guishable from that of socialist countries. Thus the U.S. is 
characterized as being imperialistic because it is capitalistic. 
It is the purpose of this paper to explore the hypothesis that 
it is not the particular ideological orientation of a country 
which determines the nature of its relations with other coun-
tries, but rather, it is a country's relative power position 
vis-a-vis other countries which determines its behavior. 
The primary theoretical justification for this position 
is derived from Robert Tucker's influential book, The Radical 
d . . . 1 Left an American Foreign Policy. Examining both American 
foreign policy in the twentieth century and the "radical cri-
tique" of that policy, Tucker argues that there is indeed no 
institutional basis for American foreign policy, that the U.S. 
has acted out of a desire to protect its security, in a greater 
than physical sense, in '.'the belief that America can only re-
generate herself by regenerating the world, that the future of 
America's institutions can be assured only if they continue to 
provide the dominant model for the world ••• " 2 Although debat-
able, it is Tucker's conclusion that a "Socialist America" 
would not have acted much differently in this century than the 
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America that we know. This position must be examined in more 
detail, however, because its "mirror image" generated the 
present paper. 
According to Tucker, the radical critique's major error is 
their insistence that American leaders are motivated by the 
conviction that it is an economic necessity of capitalism to 
pursue expansionist policies. Given alternative explanations 
of U.S. expansionism, there is no justification for asserting 
that American foreign policies are the result of economic nee-
essity, real or imagined, unless it is first assumed to be true. 
Tucker finds the radical critique thus relying heavily on those 
policy statements which support a theory of U.S. expansionism 
grounded on the economic institutions of capitalism but ignor-
ing those which support alternative explanations. 
Tucker sees the roots of American expansionism in America's 
own immense power, irregardless of how that power was achieved: 
If the answer to U.S. expansionism is not to be found 
in the objective forces generated by capitalism, it 
must be sought in the variety of motives that have al-
ways led preponderant powers to identify their prepond-
erance with their security and, above all, perhaps, 
in the fear arising from the loss of preponderance 
itself. The belief that the loss of preponderance must 
result in a threat to the well-being of the collective, 
and this irrespective of the material benefits prepond-
erance confers, is so constant a characteristic of 
imperial states that it may almojt be considered to form 
a part of their natural history. 
Intrigued by the argument that power differentials are much 
more important than ideology in explaining relations between 
states, I decided to pursue an honor's thesis which attempts 
to apply the reverse of Tucker's thesis, that is, that the 
Soviet Union's relations with smaller powers ( especially those 
in Eastern Europe ) are similar to what they would be if the 
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Soviet Union were capitalist. After considerable discussion 
with my faculty advisor, we determined that the most inter-
esting and even heretical way to approach this topic would 
be to turn the concepts originally developed by the Marxist-
Leninist inspired "dependencia theory," which explains <level-
oped capitalist relations with underdeveloped countries, on 
the Soviet Union and its relations with "the Socialist 
Commonwealth." It is therefore necessary to expend some pre-
liminary effort on dependency (the English rendering of 
dependencia) theory, a matter to which we now turn. 
II. Dependency (Dependencia) or Dependence 
The 1960s saw the emergence of a paradox of rapid economic 
growth combined with increasing poverty in the Third World. · 
Despite the fact that the average five per cent annual increase 
in gross national product achieved in most underdeveloped 
countries (UDCs ) during the 1960s is roughly double the rate 
achieved in the nineteenth century by Western Europe and North 
America, it was becoming more and more obvious that the 
development measured by per capita increase in GNP 
was not reaching the lives of ordinary people in 
terms of jobs, income dis~ribution and basic allevi-
ation ofcritical poverty. 
More specifically, a study by Irma Adelman and Cynthia Morris 
found that while the top five per cent of the population gains 
in income as growth in GNP proceeds, the income of the bottom 
forty per cent of the population falls, both relatively and 
5 
sometimes even absolutely. 
The reasons for this paradox are very fundamental, stemming 
directly from the assumptions upon which conventional develop-
ment strategies have been predicated. The predominant approach 
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to underdevelopment has emphasized a massive infusion of both 
foreign assistance and direct private investment into import-
substi tuting industrialization within the Third World countries. 
This, combined with proper governmental incentives and restric-
tive trade policies, presumably would allow underdeveloped 
economies to reach a "take-off" point into self-generating 
economic growth, paralleling the classical capitalist develop-
ment of Western Europe and North America. These strategies 
could not work, however, because the assumptions simply do not 
hold. First, it is assumed that the UDCs are self-contained 
states with independent economic, social and political systems, 
ignoring the often retarding effects of the colonial incorpor-
ation of underdeveloped economies into an international system 
which is still dominated by advanced industrial nations. 6 
Second, conventional theorists assume that UDC economies are 
pre-capitalist, resembling the economies of North America and 
Western Europe just prior to the Industrial Revolution. They 
have generally ignored-the history of UDCs which shows that 
"underdevelopment is not original or traditional and that 
neither the past nor the present of the underdeveloped economies 
resembles in any important respect the past of the now developed 
countries." 7 Finally, conventional development strategies 
presume that contact with the developed industrial countries, 
principally through massive governmental assistance and private 
investment, will stimulate economic growth. Only now are the 
negative consequences of such contact becoming apparent. 
As an alternative to conventional theories, a theory of 
dependency, or dependencia, offers another assessment of both 
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development and underdevelopment within an international cap-
italist system. A growing and varied body of literature has 
emerged under the general heading of dependency theory, often 
creating an undue amount of complexity and lack of clarity as 
to what dependency theory actually is. The following is an 
attempt to synthesize the theoretical contributions of depend-
ency theory's primary authors into its more consistent and 
8 
manageable components. 
First, however, a clear distinction must be drawn between 
the concepts of "dependence" and "dependency." Despite the 
fact that a number of authors appear to use the terms inter-
changeably, ignoring both subtle and not so subtle distinctions 
the two terms to dindeed denote completely different systems 
of relationships between nations. Stemming from different 
paradigms, the concept of dependence refers to asymmetrical 
relations between industrialized and other nations, whereas the 
concept of dependency refers to a lack of actor autonomy in 
North-South relations. Dependence refers to situations where 
tow or more nations are interdependent. This interdependence 
is highly asymmetrical in the countries involved are not equally 
dependent on each other. The country with the greatest amount 
of independence has considerable power over the country which 
suffers from a greater dependence because it can cut off 
relations with the dependent country at a considerably lesser 
cost that it, the relatively independent country, would have to 
bear. Yet the more dependent country has the ability to decide 
to resist such coercion and bear its cost, while the more indep-
endent country must also decide if it wishes to suffer the 
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costs of curtailing relations. Dependency does not deal with 
nation-states as actors in international relations. Trans-
national groups and institutions are seen as the primary 
actors, functioning in an international capitalist system. The 
international capitalist system forms a structure which dictates 
actor decision-making, thus depriving them or any decisional 
autonomy. This relationship is not assymetrical, for the trans-
national groups and institutions do not have varying degrees of 
autonomy but influenced only by the needs ofthe international 
capitalist system. James Caporaso succinctly demonstrates the 
dissimilarities between these two concepts: 
The dependence orientation seeks to probe and explore 
the syrrunetries and asyrrunetries among nation-states. 
This approach most o£ten proceeds form a liberal 
paradigm which focuses on individual actors and their 
goals and which sees power in decisional terms. The 
individual actors are usually internally unified states 
which confront the external enviornment as homogeneous 
units .•• The dependency orientation, on the other hand, 
seeks to explore the process of integration of the 
periphery into the international capitalist system and 
to assess the developmental implications of this per-
pheral capitalism. This approach proceeds from a 
structuralist paradigm which focuses on the class struc-
ture and international capital, and the role of the 
state in shaping and managing the national, foreign and 
class forces that propel development within countries. 
The dependency framework, in other words, explicitly 
rejects the unified state as an agtor as a useful con-
ceptual building block or theory. 
The key to dependency theory is the observation that 
foreign interests have so penetrated dependent societies that 
they actually become integral to those societies. The institu-
tions, social classes, and '"modernizing" processes which intern-
alize foreign influences within each dependent country form 
what Bodenheimer has named the '"infrastructure of dependency."lO 
'Sunkel explains that: 
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••• Dependencia does not treat foreign influence as 
external but as internal to the system: the mani-
fold and sometimes hidden or subtle political, fin-
ancial, economic, technical and cultural presence 
of the developed capitalist states in the underdev-
eloped country, which contributes significantly to 
shaping the nature, structure, functioning, and 
transformation of its economy, socie!I and policy; 
a kind of "fifth column" as it were. 
It is this internalization of external interests which 
makes dependency so devastating. While formal colonial control 
is gone, there is much more subtle and pervasive form of con-
trol permeating all major institutions and structures, both 
private and public, of the dependent countries. Dependency 
itself becomes institutionalized--and thus harder to overcome 
than colonialism. This becomes clear when one realizes that 
colonialism has been erradicated yet dependency has survived 
for 300 years. Irving Markovitz sees this same phenomenon 
that dependency theorists generally ascribe to Latin America 
having happened lately in Africa: 
These new countries still depended on the colonial 
powers, both for development funds and for the tech-
nology necessary to achieve a higher stadard of 
living for their peoples. The conditions of exploi-
tation remained: the new states were still producers 
of raw materials; they still had little industry; 
they were still markets for sophisticated goods •.• 
Under these circumstances ,_Lord Palmerston's dictum 
that he did not have to own an inn in order to sleep 
in it made a good deal of sense. 12 
At the heart of infrastructure of dependency, the primary 
actors in the international capitalist system, are the members 
of a transnational affluent class. United by international-
ized consumption patterns, it is their presence in the UDC that 
allows, and actually encourages, dependency's entanglements 
with advanced industrial nations. Subservient to those foreign 
interests which guarantee them in increasingly dominant position 
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within their societies through political, economic and mili-
tary support, this denationalized elite becomes "The kingpin 
and sin qua non of dependency."13 Markovitz again observes in 
Africa: 
A compradore class sits in power at the pleasure of 
foreign corporations and governments. Tool and puppet, 
its loyalties and policies are determined by these 
outside forces. Without any independent domestic base, 
its autonomy is severely circumscribed, as are its 
national loyalties.14 
It should be noted that dependency has been a dynamic pro-
cess, progressing through three clearly discernible phases 
which correspond to changes in the needs and structure of the 
international capitalist system. First was the colonial phase, 
characterized by the export of agricultural products and precious 
metals to fuel Europe's economic expansion. As the countries 
of Western Europe and North America became more advance, there 
emerged in the mid-nineteenth century a new financial-industrial 
phase of dependency. An international division of labor was 
institutionalized as both Europe and the United States invested 
heavily in food and raw materials production abroad, specializing 
in the production of manufactures at home and benefitting from 
terms oftrade which were increasingly biased in their favor. 
The exigencies of two world wars and and intervening world dep-
ression virtually forced a new policy of import-substituting 
industrialization within the Third World as the international 
capitalist system unexpectedly contracted. With the return to 
normality and accelerated U.S. expansion into Third World econo-
mies, the current phase of technological-industrial-financial 
dependency was ushered in. 
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Given the present concentration on import-substituting 
industrialization as the appropriate development strategy, it 
is important to examine more closely the nature of that 
process. It appears that foreign firms in Latin America have 
"acquired a dominant position among medium and large sized 
firms in may if not all of the many sectors and branches of 
economic activity which are not in public hands."15 
Rather than promoting development and increasing UDC 
autonomy, the resulting dependent industrialization is exacer-
bating many of the problems of underdevelopment in the Third 
World. Any hope for autonomous self-sustaining development 
grow dimmer as local factors of production are continually 
eroded by the presence of multinational corpoeration (MNC) sub-
sidiaries within the UDCs. The continued displacement and 
deterioration of local entrepeneurship causes the quality of 
local factors of production to decline. Their quantity is 
also diminished as competion with the MNCs causes them to wither, 
preventing or retarding their growth. Susanne Bodenheimer best 
expressed the true consequences of dependent industrialization: 
In short, dependent industrialization has aggravated 
rather than resolved such basic problems as balance 
of payments deficits, unemployment, income dispar-
aties and an insufficient domestic market. 16 
Within the Third World, the end result is what Sunkel has 
called dependent state capitalism. The denationalized elite 
has accepted dependency and the marginalization of growing 
sectors of its population as inevitable ingredients of devel-
opment. Thus, an increasing share of the ownership and control 
of national resources and activities is turned over to foreign 
corporations. The governmental apparatus is put at their 
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disposal for the provision of infrastructure necessary to 
corporate expansion as well as for the political and police 
repression essential for "stability." 
As inequality worsens and becomes more apparent, the result 
of this coincidence of public and private interests is institu-
tionalized violence on an increasing scale. As underdevelop-
ment is intensified within the UDCs, new sectors of the popu-
lation are becoming radicalized. UDC governments, controlled by 
a denationalized elite, are forced to apply overt repression 
against revolutionary forces and even popular movements, such 
as peasant land invasions in .Chile, resurgent labor movements 
in Argentina, and students throughout the Third World. Oppo-
sition to UDC governments only increases as the popular move-
ments spread throughout the country and the measures of repres-
sion are generalized to:.the entire nation. Bodenheimer sees a 
repression-resistance cycle becoming chronic. If a dominant 
power is forced to intervene directly, as was the case in the 
Dominican Republic, what was a reformist movement is then trans-
formed into a potentially revolutionary force. Given this 
scenario, the prospects for peaceful resolution of the problem 
of underdevelopment seem bleak. Dos Santos concludes that: 
Everything now indicates that what can be expected is 
a long process of sharp political and military con-
frontations and of profound social radicalization 
which will lead these countries to a dilemma: govern-
ments of force which open the way to fascism, or pop-
ular revolutionary governments, which open the way to 
socialism. Intermediate solutions have proved to be, 
in such contradictory reality, empty and utopian.17 
The quite extensive body of dependency literature thus pre-· 
sents a thorough, highly developed model of an international 
capitalist system characterized by a transnational network of 
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dependency relationships. The only remedy offered for a given 
country's dependent, and therefore underdeveloped, status is to 
"escape" from the international capitalist system. Uncritic-
ally, and in terms that on occasion amount to an ideological 
zealotry which characterizes capitalism as being inherently 
evil and socialism as being naturally good, dependency theorists 
are satisfied in merely offering the extremely nebulous solution 
of socialist development. Rarely, if ever, is the socialist 
course of development actually elaborated upon in any detail. 
This seems especially unwise, given the postwar example of 
Eastern Europe form which to draw some lessons. 
This inattention becomes more puzzling when one examines 
the strong intuitive case for a model of socialist dependency. 
The division of Germany into two nations, one Communist and one 
capitalist, at the end of World War II, combined with the 
emergence of other Communist regimes in Eastern Europe during 
the immediate postwar years, forced a massive redirection of 
trade within Eastern Europe. Very little of this redistribution 
is reflected in increased trading activity between the East 
European nations. Rather, one finds that the real change in 
East European trade patterns is "from irrational avoidance of 
h . . . h 18 t e USSR to irrational concentration upon er." Before World 
War II, there was little Soviet Trade with Eastern Europe. 
When Communist regimescam~ to power in Eastern Europe, trade 
with the West was virtually halted for political reasons. This 
trade was then redirected to the Soviet Union. The Soviet 
Union's share of the total turnover in mutual foreign trade 
within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA ) coun@ 
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tries has consistently been approximately 37 per cent since 
1950. 19 The complete dominance of the Sov.iet economy within 
the CMEA is demonstrated when one considers that the USSR alone 
contributes 70 per cent of its entire industrial and agricultural 
d t . 20 pro uc ion. Thus 7 it 1s no wonder that "in terms of volume 
and structure 7 trade with the Soviet Union is one of the de-
cisive factors of the steady economic growth of the CMEA 
. 21 
countries." 
On a more theoretical level7 the potential for the Soviet 
Union to exploit its satellites via the system of socialist 
international relations is as great 7 or greater, than that 
which operates in the international capitalist system. John 
Galtung, using the hypothetical examples of the General Motors 
Corporation and the International Communist Movement, has demon-
strated that international political organizations can serve 
theoretically similar functions in establishing center-periphery 
relationships. 22 - Moreover, because a Soviet corporation is 
under the direct control of the government, its activities can 
be coordinated with those of other Soviet corporations as well 
as with Soviet foreign trade. Its direct links with the Soviet 
Government gives it yet another advantage over its capitalist 
counterparts in that diplomatic support is also far more direct. 23 
Finally, the extensive reliance on bilateral trade within the 
Soviet bloc institutionalizes a system whereby the Soviet Union, 
with its economic predominance, can potentially determine to a 
large extent both the flow of exports and imports within the 
CMEA. 24 
Given this strong intuitive case for a system of socialist 
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dependency, the following sections will be an attempt to actu-
ally document the existence of such a hypothes.ized system of 
international relations within the East European Soviet bloc. 
III. The Socialist Infrastructure of Dependency 
As noted above, the importance of internalizing foreign 
influences in establishing dependency relationshJps• cannot be 
overemphasized. Beginning with Stalin, it has been a clear 
and deliberate policy of the Soviet Government to effect its 
interests directly in the decision-making processes of its 
East European satellites. The principal structure through 
which the Soviets are able · to influence directly the internal 
decision-making of satellite countries is the national Communist 
Party with its complete monopolization of political and economic 
power within each respective country. Typically the East Europ-· 
ean Communist Parties constitute only two to five per cent of 
the population. 25 They invariably play a subordinate role to 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The CPSU re-
serves the right to define both what a genuine Leninist regime 
is and the broad limits within which it must behave. 26 Nation-
alism becomes equated with revisionism and is isolated as a 
f th b . . . . t 27 h . weapon o e ourgeois JJnper1al1s s. T e CPSU itself best 
elaborated on its unique position among the Communist Parties 
of East Europe in a secret 1956 memorandum: 
The CPSU considers that it remains the 'directing party' 
amongst all the Communist organizations of the world. 
Each Communist Party is judged in light of the more or 
less intimate relations which it has with the CPSU, for 
the interests of the CPSU are closely tied in with 
those of the othersister parties ... 28 
The key to CPSU domination over East European Communist 
Parties is the denationa1ization of the local ruling elite 
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through control of personal loyalties within the Communist 
Party hierarchies. 29 Since Stalin, Soviet leaders have gen-
erally tended to focus not on the nature of specific policies 
but on who they would benefit. A policy was deemed unaccept-
able on the basis of whether or not the local Communist Party 
would win enough popular support to secure for itself autonomy 
from the Soviet Union. In Czechoslovakia, it was thus unaccept- · 
able for the Dubcek regime to establish diplomatic relations 
with Bonn in 1968 because of the popular support it would 
generate, but in 1973 the Soviets warmly endorsed Husak's 
recognition of Bonn because it strengthened a regime already 
securely under Soviet influence while also complimenting the 
Soviet Union's own policy of detente. 
The best way to ensure that local policies do not deviate 
from within certain defined limits is to influence cadre appoint-
ments, especially under continually changing circumstances. 
It is both logical and consistent for Soviet leaders to desire 
direct control over personnel, for this how they themselves 
retain control within the CPSU. The Soviet leaders realize that 
ultimately it is essential to maintain an influential group of 
Sovietized national elites within the East Europe Communist 
Parties. One cannot help but notice the striking degree of 
similarity between Sunke1•s description of dependency in Latin 
America and Jones' description of the rela~ionship between Soviet 
and East European ruling elites: 
Moscow is also dependent on them [the East European ruling 
eliteJ The Soviet leaders require a fifth column in the 
East European party to legitimize the use of Soviet troops 
and to form a new gover~ent [in the event an anti-Soviet 
clique comes to power.] 
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The most general and pervasive mechanism for fostering 
Soviet loyalties among the East European elite is cultural 
integration, through both deliberate policies and the natural 
processes arising from increased contacts between the Soviet 
and East European peoples. The existence of party cells makes 
"it possible for the Soviets to penetrate the entire political, 
economic, social and cultural fabric of an East European country."31 
More,specific mechanisms to ensure loyalty to Moscow among 
local Communist Party cadres have included periodic purges, 
political blackmail, the utilization of latent or existing 
national antagonisms to "divide and conquer," the encouragement 
and support of factionalism within the local Communist Parties to 
bring down hostile regimes, and the official excommunication 
of rebellious members. 32 Positive reinforcement for loyalty to 
Moscow has included economic assistance during times of economic 
crisis so that "muscoviet" regimes could avoid excessive criticism 
. h' h . 33 . . . b from wit in t eir party. By also encouraging rising ureaucrats 
from East European Communist Parties to attend Soviet party and 
technical schools, the Soviets are better al:ie to implant personal 
loyalties toward Moscow as well as establish personal contacts 
with them. These personal relationships between Soviet and 
East Europeai officials are continued through "pen-pal" correspond-
ence. 34 Soviet officials are thereby able to continue to in-
fluence East European officials after they leave the USSR. Ex-
posure to Soviet attitudes and culture becomes a continuous pro-
cess. 
Evidence of the denationalized character of the East 
European ruling elite is both public and frequently encountered. 
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References to an "ever closer rapprochement with the Soviet 
Union in all spheres of economic and cultural life" by the 
Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee and to the "special 
importance [given] to further tightening economic, scientific 
and technical links with the Soviet Union," by Edward Gierek, 
first secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party, are just 
35 two examples. Nor are references to especially "close" ties 
with the Soviet Union limited to the offical statements of 
East European leaders. While provisions of a Soviet-East 
German treaty refer to a unified foreign policy, ammendments to 
the January 1976 Polish Constitution explicitly refer to 
h . . d h' d . . h h 36 "strengt ening frien sip an cooperation wit t e USSR ..• " 
The existence of the infrastructure of dependency would 
be functional only to the extent that it allowed· the. dominant 
country, the Soviet Union, to exploit and condition dependent 
economies, those of Eastern Europe, in response to its own 
national economic needs. Thus, one cannot be surprised by the 
conclusion reached by Goldman in his 1967 study of Soviet economic 
re1ations with other socialist countries: 
The Soviet Union's economic policy toward its less 
powerful allies sometimes has been as imperialistic 
as anything devised by the most avaricious firms in 
the West toward the .... developing countries. _By means 
of war reparations, joint stock companies, and dis-
discriminatory pricing, the Russians have contrived 
schemes thatwrula make even such masters of intrigue 
as Union Miniere du Haut-Katanga, United Fruit, and 
Standard Oil blush with embarrassment.37 
The development of dependency within the socialist common 
wealth can be divided into three distinct phases, similar to 
the development of dependency within the international 
capitalist system •. As one woul expect, the unique needs of the 
Soviet economy, as well as the speed with which socialist 
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dependency has developed, essentially compressing a process 
which took over 300 years in the international capitalist 
system into just over 30 years, has had the affect of re-
ducing the quality of the "mirror Image" and of blurring 
the division between phases. Yet, the resemblance is too 
striking to be dismissed as merely coincidental. 
IV. Quasi-Colonialism: 1945-1953 
The first evidence of exploitation by the USSR emerges 
as one examines the Soviet war reparations policies pursued 
in Eastern Europe following World War II up until Stalin's 
death: 
••• one of the major Soviet objectives in seizing 
control of Eastern Europe after World War II was 
to utilize the resource~ .of--the area to promote 
Soviet postwar economic recovery and development. 
At least during the Stalinist period, the Kremlin 
treated the region as a colony to be exploited for 
the benefit of the Soviet economy.38 
Former Axis allies, even if they were neutral or Soviet 
allies during part of the war, were forced to renounce claims 
on Germany. All local property seized or acquired by the 
Germans, as well as Western assets, were claimed by the 
Soviets. In addition, Hungary and Rumania were both required 
to pay war retribution to the USSR. So great was the Rumanian 
burden that the country actuall appeared on the verge of bank-
ruptcy and anarchy. 
While Poland was officially excused from any reparations, 
it was forced to exchange valuable exports of coal at a 
"favorable" price well below world market prices in exchange 
for Soviet confiscated German property in Poland and 15 per 
cent of Germany's reparations to the USSR. 
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Numerous other commodities, such as Rumanian oil, were 
also sold to the Soviets at prices substantially below world 
prices. While no official statistics are available prior 
to 1955, it is reasonalby certain that such price discrim-
ination was prevalent all throughout the period 1945-1955. 
While the Soviets have claimed to have repaid their Eastern 
satellites for at least some of this .exploitation, it is im-
possible to estimate both what could have been received from 
Western Europe in exchange for those commodities (especially 
since many of these commodities, like oil and coal, were 
scarce on world markets) and what the long-term costs were 
of directing East European trade away form the West. 39 
East Germany presents a unique instance of extreme ex-
ploitation. It appears that virtually everything the East 
German economy could of fer the Soviet economy was taken, in 
whatever form possible, including even the transportation of 
thousands of civilian specialists to the Soviet Union. As a 
resuLt of these practices, 20 to 30 per cent of the East 
German GNP was syphoned off to the USSR between 1945 and 1953. 40 
One more feature of Soviet postwar policy deserves special 
attention, and that is the Soviet Joint Stock Corporations 
(JSC). 41 Among the direct advantages to the Soviet economy 
from the JSC, established in Yugoslavia, Hungary, Rumania, 
and East Germany, were a steady source of revenue, priority 
shipments of goods (sometimes at drastically reduced prices ) 
during a time ofsevere international shortage, as well as 
assured supplies of uranium ore and nonferrous metals which 
have traditionally been in short supply in the Soviet Union. 
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The JSC were centered in key industries such as shipping, pet-
roleum, chemicals, uranium, airlines and aluminum. In most 
instances, the Soviet contribution was minimal, consisting 
largely of the return of war reparations. Yet the Soviets de-· 
manded full comp~nsation for their 50 per cent ownership of 
all the JSC when they were eventually dissolved between 1953 
and 1956. Goldman concludes: 
Unlike the reparation demands, for which there was 
often a moral justification, or discriminatory 
pricing, for which there may have been at least 
some theoretical justification, the termination of 
the JSC was in the best tradition of a colonial 
powero Few if any American or European companies 
have been so "imperialistic ..... 42 
v. Exploitation Through Unfavorable Terms of Trade: 1955 - 1965 
While the CMEA countries were released from their remaining 
debts in 1956, official Soviet trade data tend to indicate that 
the area of Soviet exploitation had shifted more overtly to 
. d. . . t' . . b d 43 price iscr1m1na ion in intra- loc tra e. Whether or not 
such price discrimination was, in fact, a mechanism by which 
the Soviets deliberately regained lost revenue, or whether the 
price discrimination documented in official Soviet trade stati-
sties released for the first time in 1958 was a continuation 
of a postwar practice, it was clear that: 
Whatever Soviet propaganda may assert to the contrary, 
the COMECON countries are still Moscow's satellites 
and not its equal partners. The Soviet Union concocts 
import and export prices to suit its own convenience, 
using methods of direct compulsion to impose them. This 
makes normal, mutua1ly advantageo~~ collaboration and 
the division of labor impossible. 
As an aside, it is important to realize that exploitation 
through the manipulation of import and export prices is not 
confined to the Soviet bloc. In their landmark 1974 study of 
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multinational corporations, Barnet and Muller discuss the mech-
anism of "transfer pricing" by which MNCs disguise significant 
amounts of repatriated profits through price discriminatmn in 
the trade conducted between their subsidiaries. 45 In Latin 
America alone, 75 per cent of U.S.-based MNCs which engage in 
export limit their transactions to other subsidiaries of the 
parent MNC. Export prices are, on the average, 40 per cent less 
than those charged by local firms. Where it is to their advan~ 
tage, MNC imports are over priced form 16 to 155 per cent. 
While the cost to the dependent UDCs cannot be estimated, 
Barnet and Muller conclude: 
The widespread use of transfer pricing so central 
to the cross-subsidization strategies of the global 
corporation is designed •.. to create what amounts to 
a private economy .••• "Prices in an economic sense ... 
do not exist. The irice charged is strictly a matter 
of relative power." 6 
Many studies of Soviet intra-bloc price discrimination 
between 1954 and 1964, using official Soviet statistics, have 
47 been conducted. In particular, Mendershausen finds that the 
USSR's price advantage ranged form 20 to 30 per cent during the 
period 1955-1959. Kutt concluded that this price adv~ntage 
amounted to over $12.7 billion in "illegitimate profits" between 
1954 and 1964; or approximately three and a half times the 
amount of Soviet aid given in the same perioa. 48 
The most blatant case of deliberate Soviet price discrim-
ination against a satellite country involves the $15 billion 
1966-1970 trade agreement reached with East Germany. On April 
3, 1965, Dr. Erich Apel, chief of the .East German Planning 
Commission, apparently committed suicide in protest over the 
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unfavorable terms of trade embodied in the new trade agreement 
with the USSR, fearing that the resUlting damage to the East 
German economy would "destroy the effects of his work." Numer-
ous East German exports vere to be delivered to the Soviet 
Union at prices considerably below workd market prices, includ-
ing 300 sea-going ships at 30 per cent below world market prices. 
Shortly after the treaty was signed, the Soviets announced the 
sale of $105 million worth of ships at world prices. The East 
Germans were also to be committed to buying large quantities of 
raw materials form the Soviet Union at prices considerably 
higher than those on the world market. Allegedly, the Soviets 
justified such inequities on the grounds that the Soviet Union 
had to offset its tremendous armaments burden and besides, the 
East Germas already had a higher standing of living than the 
S . t 49 ovie s. 
Thus, like its capitalist counterparts within the inter-
national capitalist system, the Soviet Union responded to chang-
ing conditions within its own international system and extracted 
from its satellites resources to fuel its own developmental 
needs. Only the specific mechanism differed, according to the 
particular circumstances of the times. 
VI. Socialist Economic Integration and the International 
Division of Labor: 1966 to the Present 
Through both official policies and more subtle economic 
and political presst+re, the Soviet Union is currently tight-
ening its control over East European development. The Soviet 
Union's current efforts to promote increased economic inte-
gration within the CMEA must be seen as an effort to adapt 
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dependency to changes in the economic and political enviornrnent 
of Eastern Europe. 
Defenders of Soviet benevolence can cite the reversal, 
since the rnid-60s, of Soviet terms of trade with Eastern Europe 
because the prices of the raw materials which it exports has 
fallen relative to the prices of the manufactured products which 
it imports from Eastern Europe. While in the short-run it might 
appear that the Soviets are actually being "exploited," one 
cannot ignore the long-run enhancement of Soviet domination 
' h ' 50 resulting from sue a policy. Such a policy both helps ensure 
political stability in the East European states by avoiding 
unnecessary economic difficulties, 51 whiie at the same time 
making East European leaders increasingly dependent on what 
'd . . 52 amounts to a subsi y on vital raw materials. 
Moreover, at least in the area of oil, this picture of 
"exploitation" is rapidly chaging. As demand for Soviet oil, 
which already accounts for 80 per cent of Eastern Europe's supply, 
increases, the price of Soviet~oi1- will. double between now and 
1985. The 1985 price will be equivalent to the projected world 
price of $30 a barrel unless there is an intervening boost in 
world oil prices, which will lead to a corresponding increase in 
·the price of Soviet oil. Payment is increasingly being demanded 
in the form of scarce transferrable currencies, Eastern Europe's 
best industrial products and/or nationally needed investment 
funds. Of the 76 joint industrial projects whithin the CMEA, 
approximately one-fourth are located inside the Soviet Union, 
53 
and these are typically the largest. 
Industrial penetration of Eastern Europe by the Soviet 
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Union is also significant. The 1,334 large industrial enter-
prises completed by 1974 with Soviet financial and technical 
assistance, not including the capacity of 65 projects then 
still under construction, equalled the Soviet Union's own pre-
d . d . . t 54 Worl War II in ustrial capac1 y. In particular, the majority 
of the largest ferrous metallurgical enterprises in the CMEA, 
"which to a considerable degree determines the level of devel-
opment of their national economy ... were planned in the USSR, 
were built with the help of Soviet specialists, and to a con-
siderable degree were outfitted with Soviet equipment. 1155 
As a primary source of technology for the CMEA countries, 
the Soviet Union exercises a dominant position in affecting the 
eonomic growth and development of the region. Growing at a 
56 
rate of nine per cent annually between 1966 and 1970, the 
Soviet technical transfers have been at a rate of 3.5 to one 
t . d 57 over a twen y year per10 . As a result of political pressure 
to "force Soviet technology on other countries," the flow of 
technical documentation to Czechoslovakia and East Germany, 
both technologically "much more advanced" than the Soviet Union, 
exceeds the reverse flow. 58 These technology transfers have 
also included the sale of obsolete technology. 59 
The tremendous size and relatively primitive nature of the 
Soviet domestic market further ensures a growing dependency 
60 
structure. Because the ~ajority of East European manufactured 
commodities are of poor quality and/or obsolete, they are 
unacceptable outside of the CMEA at current prices. In the 
short-run, re-orientation of trade patterns is thus precluded, 
but in the long-run this dependency is perpetuated as industrial 
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production becomes geared to the special needs of the Soviet 
economy. 
As a mechanism for ensuring these dependent relations among 
socialist states, the CMEA is allowing the USSR to perpetuate 
61 
and strengthen its domination over Eastern Europe. Aside 
from the Soviet Union's political domination of CMEA organs, 62 
the Soviet Union's economic preponderance will allow it to: 
demand conformity if the regional structure of 
relationships fails to ensure disciplined behavior 
by preventing the emergence of aberrant political 
and economic reforms. For example, the Soviets 
can refuse to guarantee energy supplies, as they 
did in 1971 before the retrenchmegj of the 
Hungarian New Economic Mechanism. 
The CMEA offers the Soviet Union serveral subtle mech-
anisms for strengthening its own dominant position. Increasing 
Soviet pressure for integration can be seen as an effort to sub-
due nationalistic forces in Eastern Europe. Long range invest-
ment and trade agreements further tie East European states to 
the USSR, decreasing their own political autonomy. Periodic 
multilateral contacts allow the Soviet Union's primary interests 
to be defined and defended while emphasizing to the East 
European participants the acceptable limits to national indepen-
dence. 64 
In general, the international division of labor envisioned 
for the CMEA will benefit the Soviet Union because prices for 
its own basic goods exports will remain unchanged while the 
prices for its own principal imports will be decreased as 
economies of scale and efficiency savings are realized in other 
. 65 . CMEA countries. Both Rumania and Bulgaria claim the inter-
national division of labor proposed by the Soviets is stifling 
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opportunity would soon arise for the Soviets to put into power 
more "cooperative" leaders. Meanwhile, the Yugoslav Communist 
Party looked forward to joining the socialist camp in a privil-
eged position, second only to that of the CPSU. Expecting full 
respect for their national sovereignty and relations based on 
equality, the Yugoslavs learned, 
only gradually and painfully •.• that their country~s 
interests and aims might not always be identical 
with those of the Soviet Union, and that the latter 
wpuld hav~ as J_ittl~ 9om:punctio1']. gs . tpe 95pitalist 
powers in sacrificing them to their own. 
It was on the basis of this experience that the Yugoslav 
Communist Party concluded in 1952 that: 
The clash which has occurred between ourselves and 
the USSR in 1948 was not accidental .••. It happened 
at the. moment when we clearly saw that the USSR was 
abandoning socialist principles, not only in its 
domestic policy but in its foreign policy, and was 
openly following the path of imperialistic e~pansion­
ism •.• The USSR has long since diverged in their 
internal evolution from socialist development into 
state capitalism and unprecedented bureaucratic 
system.71 
The subsequent activities of the USSR further the contention 
that the Ygoslav-Soviet dispute centered on Soviet control of 
local ruling elites. In addition to attempts to directly 
instigate subversion within Yugoslavia and thereby topple the 
Tito regime, the Soviets launched an extensive campaign through-
out the rest of Eastern Europe to purge from positions of power 
all those "people who show even passive resistance to the course 
of hegemony adopted by the Soviet Union .•. "72 
The second major threat to the integrity of the socialist 
camp was the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. 73 The Soviets were' 
forced to intervene when the government of Premier Imre Nagy 
endorsed the withdrawal of Hungary form the Warsaw Pact, the 
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unconditional removal of Soviet troops from Hungary, Hungarian 
neutrality, and, ultimately, the abolition of the one-party 
state and subsequent free elections. It was clearly a revol-
ution against subordination to and exploitation by a foreign 
power. Sinner explained the reformers' ultimate mistake: 
In short, their ideas were imbued with "national 
content," violating the cardinal tenet of "prole-
tarian. internationalism" which demands subordin-
ation of national interest to the welfare fo the 
whole socialist block as determined by its leading 
member, the Soviet Union.74 
The Soviet response was quite decisive. Janos Kadar 
"entered Budapest in the .. wake of the .··.Russian armies, 1175 
establishing a government again subservient to Soviet interests. 
Forming a new Communist Party modeled after the now defunct 
Stalinist Hungarian Workers' Party, it was christened the 
Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, as Kadar, 
Totally dependent for his survival on Soviet arms ••• 
sought to steal whatever prestige and legitimacy 
[which] may have adhered to the title of an anti-
Soviet, pro-Nagy and 2ro-October, and, what is more, 
anti-Stalinist party.76 
Perhaps, the most interesting case, the Czechoslovakian 
reformism which lead to the Soviet invasion in 1968 had its 
foundation in the inability of the Czech Government to fulfill 
basic domestic demands due to a "twenty-year record of rule 
77 
subservient to an alien power." The precedence given Soviet 
interests prevented the efficient management of the economy. 
This was responsible for the Czech Government's inability to 
lead the country to economic progress and improve the standard 
78 
of living of its people. Significantly, it was the publica-
tion of the pro-Soviet faction's long history of close relations 
with Moscow and its poor record in office by the- Czect press 
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that helped propel the Progressive faction under Dubcek into 
79 power. 
It is important, however, to emphasize the limits to 
Czeshoslovakian reformism in 1968. In essence, the reforms 
80 
were designed to provide for decision-making by consensus. 
Various groups and special interests within the Czech society 
would be allowed to voice their own views. A significant elememt 
in this policy was Czechoslovakia's continuing problem with 
. l' 81 h . . h Slovak nationa ism. But t ese reforms explicitly fell s ort 
of ending the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia's (CPC ) mono-
. . 
82 h th poly of political power. Furt ermore, ese reforms were spec-
ific to Czechoslovakian needs. Because "no other population in 
the Soviet bloc shares the Czech tradition of liberal and politi-
cal values .•• the Soviets did not fear that Prague's liberalism 
would lead to the disintegration of Communist regimes." Even in 
Slovak Communities, broad support was won only for the policy of 
83 greater autonomy for the Slovak Communist Party. 
A very persuasive argument has been made by Jones that the 
only reason for Soviet intervention was the loss of control over 
84 the CPC, which it had dominated since the early 1950s. With 
Novotny's downfall in January of 1968, the Soviets lost control 
over cadre appointments within the CPC. Further, the Progressives 
had successfully purged pro-Soviet factions from within the army 
and the ministries of justice and the interior. The final blow 
was to come at the "extraordinary" party congress that was to 
meet two years ahead of schedule that September, where the Pro-
gressives hoped to elect a new, Progressive, Central Committee. 
What is particularly persuasive is the support given the Czech 
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Progressives by Tito (who had supported Soviet intervention to 
quash the Hungarian Revolution as regrettable but necessary), by 
Nicolae Ceausescu, President of Rumania, and by Enver Hoxa, 
First Secretary of the Albanian Party who probably would have 
supported the Soviets had they perceived a real threat to 
Czechoslovakian Communist rule. 
The theoretical justification for the 1968 Czech invasion 
is the "Brezhnev Doctrine" or "Doctrine of Limited Sovereignty."85 
Essentially, it allows for the direct military intervention by 
socialist states whenever the "gains of socialism" are deemed 
threatened by foreign imperialists or domestic factions or 
"rightist revisionism ... Sovereignty, in theory is thus limited 
by the exigencies of the socialist commonwealth and proletarian 
internationalism. In reality, however, 
The Brezhnev doctrine merely transfers the allegiance 
due to the Soviets under Stalinism to the Socialist 
Community. But since the Soviet Union is the politi-
cal, economic and military keystone of that community, 
allegiance to the latter cannot be separated from 
allegiance to the former.86 
To the Chinese, the Brezhnev Doctrine is nothing more than 
"Social-imperialism," or "imperialism with a socialist label."87 
The Doctrine is based on the theory that as capitalism becomes 
progressively weaker, corresponding to the increasing dominance 
of socialism, capitalism will become more and more agressive 
and thus more dangerous, attacking the "weakest links" in the 
socialist system. The fact that Czechoslovakia had been repeat-
edly ref erred to as the most advanced member of the socialist 
commonwealth next to the USSR itself, yet was also the only 
country in which the Brezhnev Doctrine has been invoked to 
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justify Societ military intervention, has led Mitchell to con-
elude that: 
In terms of the plain language of Brezhnev and 
other Soviet spokesmen, one would be quite ju$.ified 
in retitling the Brezhnev Doctrine "Imperialism: the 
Highest Stage of Socialism" sirice developmental 
imperatives of an advanced stage of socialist devel-· 
opment are now sween as requiring overt application 
of coercions§cross national boundaries among socialist 
subsystems. 
Completely dominated by Soviet officers and lacking any 
significance or identity outside the USSR's own defense policy, 
the Warsaw Alliance allows the Soviet Union to launch attacks 
against recalcitrant satellites under the guise of the collect-
ive defense of the socialist commonwealth. 89 Citing the 
Czechoslovakian invasion as an example, the late Chief of Staff 
of the Warsaw Pact Forces, General Sergei N. Shtemenko explained 
thct. the main military purpose of the Warsaw Alliance is the 
"suppression of counterrevolutionary and aggressive action 
. s . . t t . 90 against oc1al1s coun ries." Ostensibly established to 
counter NATO's presence in Western Europe, it appears that the 
real parallel of the Warsaw Pact is the Rio Pci_ct · and the 
Organization of American States. While NATO is "outward looking" 
and.-e;?Cplicit;ty not a mechanism by which the U.S. or any NATO 
ally could invade another NATO country, both the Rio Pact and 
the Warsaw Pact are "inward looking" and exist for the preser-
vation of hegemony control over regions. As efforts to restore 
to power a denationalized elite, the 1965 United States inva-
sion of the Dominican Republic under the auspices of the 
Organization of American States and the 1968 Soviet invasion of 
C h 1 k . . t 11 . d' t' . h b 9 1 zec os ova ia are vir ua y in is inguis a le. 
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VIII. Conclusions 
Dependency theorists of fer a structural theory of under-
development based on the workings of the international capital-
i~t system. The interests of the dominant industrialized states, 
through both transnational institutions and, most importantly, 
transnational classes, are seen to penetrate completely the 
internal structures and institutions of dependent countries, 
forcing a subordination of purely national interests. Comple-
mentary economies, subservient to the needs of larger, more 
advanced industrial nations, develop in countries governed by a 
denationalized elite which owes both its allegiance and its 
position of power to these dominant countries. The inevitable 
result of this suppression of national interests is under-
development. As nationalistic elements within the Third World 
societies begin to realize that (their only solution exists in 
' 
."breaki:rig away" from the international capitalist system, the 
dominant industrialized countries are forced to defend their 
system's integrity, which must ultimately involve the use of 
direct military force. 
This paper has attempted to demonstrate that the Soviet 
Union, as the dominant power within an international socialist 
system, has severely curtailed the autonomy of East European 
countries in an attempt to impose upon them a similar relation-
92 
ship of dependency. Based on the authority of a ruling 
Communist Party, itself a definitive example of a denationalized 
elite, subservient to Moscow, the Soviet Union has been able to 
penetrate virtually every aspect of political and economic 
decision-making within its satellite states. Other international 
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institutions, such as the CMEA and the Warsaw Pact, further serve 
to guarantee an essential complementarity in the development of 
East European economies. The result has been increasing depend-
ency in trade, technology, and political policies, as well as 
the exploitation and actual restructuring of the resulting depend-
ent economies. Like its capitalist counterparts, the Soviet 
Union has been forced, on several occasions, to preserve the in-
' tegrity of its socialist commonwealth from perceived threats, 
almost exclusively internal/national. 
In attempting to compare systems of socialist dependency 
and capitalist dependency, one must realize that the two systems 
of exploitation are "cousins," not "brothers." Traditional 
dependency theorists continually emphasize the dynamic nature 
of the dependency relationship which has allowed it to evolve 
continuously from colonial times. 93 Just as the theorists point 
out that dependency has adapted to dramatic changes in the 
international capitalist system over time, one would expect 
dependency similarly to adapt to the international socialist 
system. It would be too simplistic to assume socialist depend-
ency would be a "mirror image" of capitalist dependency. 
Dependency within the capitalist sphere developed over 300 years, 
as opposed to less that thirty-five for the socialist sphere. 
Further, it would be ludicrous to assume the Soviet Union could 
match in any way the tremendous economic resourced of the Western 
World, let alone the United: States .. Finally, ' the Soviet Unions's 
economic needs are quite different from those of the West. 
Immensely rich in raw materials and less developed industrially 
than some of its satellites and the ~'lest in general, the specific 
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forms which socialist dependency takes would be expected to be 
different. The very nature of a Communist regime must also 
have some conditioning effect on dependency relations. Thus 
I have attempted to focus ·on those elements which are unique 
to dependency per se: transnational institutions and groupings 
which internalize or assule that foreign influences take hold 
within the dependent country; indications of such penetration 
by foreign interests, such as unfavorable terms of trade, 
concentration in trade, and the concomitant restructuring of 
national economies growing in ways compementary to a domiant 
foreign economy; imbalanced technological transfers and the 
efforts taken by the dominant country to preserve its inter-
national system against perceived threats. 
In light of the findings of this study, even dependency 
theory, as well as other theories which attribute the relations 
between nations to their ideological orientations, must be 
carefully reexamined. The critical assumption behind dependency 
theory is that it is the capitalist orientation of the inter-
na~ional economic system which uniquely and inherently causes 
the emergence of a duality of development and underdevelopment. 
Hence dependency theorists assume that the absence of capitalist 
influences is sufficient for development. Yet there is strong 
evidence to indicate that the Soviet Union, a socialist state, 
conducts it international relations in a fashion which parallels 
the worst alleged abuses of capitalism. The fact that two 
systems, operating on the basis of essentially antithetical 
ideological orientations, can and do behave in similar ways, 
implies that something other than ideology is the determin'.f.ilg: 
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factor in international relations. The evidence indicates that 
the .. motivating facU:r is power asymmetries among nations s as 
the Greeks knew long ago, the strong do what they will and the 
weak do what they must. 
If America's primary foreign policy objective is the pro-
tection of its security in the greater than physical sense, it 
would appear that the Soviets, too, have made this a basic 
tenet of their own foreign policy. Ideological differences 
aside, the U.S. and the USSR behave in a similar fashion because 
their predominance within their respective SP.heres of · influence 
allows them to, regardless of the consequences for weaker 
countries which happen to fall within the definition of either 
superpower's "security" interests. 
;i:n trying to relate the above analogies, many contend that 
the USSR is not a truly socialist state, but has veered from 
its revolutionary course and the Soviet policies are thus the 
result of its reversion to a form of state capitalism or 
socialist imperialism. But the assumption that the Soviet Union 
could be described as a capitalist country simply does not hold. 
The Soviet economy lacks many of the characteristics essen-
tial to a capitalistic economy. 'The Soviet Union is a command 
economy; central planning has replaced market mechanisms in 
most economic activity. There is no capital-owning class, the 
vast bulk of all national resources being nationalized and 
controlled by the state. Moreover, the business cycles which 
have characterized capitalist economies, especially in Marxist 
1 · absent. 94 ana ys1s, are 
One must not apply an overly restrictive definition of 
a socialist economy. There are many different examples of 
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what are generally considered capitalist economies. Also, the 
fact that socialist economic systems are still comparatively 
new phenomenon, many of their basic characteristics are still 
evolving. Each socialist economy is in essence an experiment 
and will respond to the varying under which it is attempted. 
If one assumes that the Soviet Union is capitalist, a primary 
example of socialist development is lost. The Soviet Union 
developed the first socialist economy. For many years it had 
the only socialist economy and had served as the only model 
for socialist development until the relatively recent emergence 
of other socialist states. Thus, if the Soviet Union appears 
to have become a capitalist state, one must ask why has such 
an aberration occurred? The answer would be that it happened 
because the Soviets were able to act in ways which resemble the 
actions of great powers. As already noted above, the Soviet 
Union's economic preponderance alone guarantees it a central 
role in influencing the economic development of Eastern Europe. 
While power assymetries seem to play a dominant role in 
determining the nature of relations between nations, one must 
not mistake these power assymetries, or power itself, for an 
ideology which guides a country's behavior. Rather, it is seen 
as an alternative to ideology for explaining international 
relations. Preponderance allows national interest to replace 
ideological commitment in foreign affairs. Under such circum-
stances, ideoloby may be used to offer an ex post facto 
rationalizations for a particular country's nationalistic 
actions, as the USSR did in formulating the Brezhnev Doctrine 
after the 1968 Czechoslovakia invasion. Bu~ it is purely 
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national interests which motivate a country into undertaking 
such actions and power assymetries which allow such actions to 
take place. 
In attempting to adapt dependency theory to Soviet relations 
with Eastern Europe, several possible conceptual difficulties 
must be examined. The first is the historical nature of 
dependency. As discussed above, underdevelopment is not original 
or traditional, but the result of the evolution of the inter-
national capitalist system since colonial times. The indust-
rialized nations of the West were able to fuel their own 
development throsgh,. the, exp16i ti ve.~ relations:.. of: dependency, 
thereby generating the underdevelopment of satellite states. 
A possible criticism thus exists if when applying the depenency 
paradigm to Eastern Europe one does not show that Eastern Europe 
was not underdeveloped prior to 1945, that it has become under-
developed since the Communist regimes took power, and the USSR 
has become more developed than its East European satellites as 
a result of this process. In other words, one would have to 
demonstrate that the 300 year evolution of the international 
capitalist system has been compressed and replicated within the 
35 year history of socialist East Europe. 
Such a criticism is not valid for two reasons. First, the 
concept that underdevelopment is neither original or traditional 
is not essential to the paradigm. What is essential is that the 
dominant Western countries were able to develop at the expense 
of satellite states. Whether or not those states were under-
developed when dependency was originally established is not as 
important. Rather, it must be demonstrated that the dependency 
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relationship caused the development of a satellite to be 
significantly less that what it otherwise might have been. Thus, 
Brazil, South Korea and Taiwan can begin to emerge from the 
ranks of the underdeveloped nations while still remaining 
clearly in a state of dependency. 
Second, dependency is not a historical process. Because 
the three phases of dependency are so distinct, they cannot be 
considered expressions of varying degrees of capitalism, but 
qualitively different forms of capitalism. Thus, a historical 
paradigm is inappropriate. Caporaso explains that: 
Of course there . . are more ur less discontinuous eras 
in the history of the global [capitalist] system, such 
as the slave colonial era, mercantile era, or the era 
characterized by the transnational mobility of tech-
nology and capital, but these eras are conceptualized 
as qualitatively different expressions of capitalism at 
the global level--not as variations (hence magnitudes ) 
along a unidimensional continuum. Hence, hypotheses 
about relationships between the degree of dependency 
and dependent variables cannot be evaluated inside 
this [historical] framework, while propositions about 
historical qualitative transformations (e.g., from 
slave-plantation to mercantile dependency) can be 
assessed.95 
The absence or presence of dependency before or after the 
current ph~se of dependency is irrelevant to the current exist-
ence of dependency. The present technological-industrial-
financial phase of dependency is more conditioned by the changes 
in the international capitalist system than by any preceeding 
forms of dependency. 
While dependency may have gone through three distinct 
phases in Latin America over the past 300 years, this time frame 
is not central to the paradigm. Africa was freed form the yoke 
of colonialism relatively recently. The West did not enter 
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South East Asia until well after colonialism was ended in 
Latin America. Thus, even if dependency is a historical pro-
cess, this does not automatically rule out Eastern Europe as 
another example of dependency relationships simply because of 
its short 35 year history under Communist rule. 
Many will still argue that by taking dependency theory out 
of its historical context the _paradigm is changed. I would like 
to think that the paradigm is simply better clarified, being 
stripped of another nonessential element, while at the same 
time adding a new perspective based on the different historical 
experiences of other regions. However, it is still unclear 
how far one can go in refining a paradigm before one abandons 
it altogether and creates a new paradigm. Perhaps dependency 
needs a new paradigm that can explain clearly related phenomenon. 
The second major conceptual problem in trying to adapt depend-
ency to socialist countries is the lack of a dynamic element in-
herent to socialism to explain why dependency has developed. 
The capitalist countries allegedly created dependency relation-
ships out of economic necessity, yet a similar instiutional 
cause of socialist dependency is not so easily postulated. 
Perhaps the answer is found if one accepts that the U.S. does not 
act out of economic necessity, but rather the idea that its 
security has been defined in a greater than physical sense. Thus, 
the dynamic element of dependency is not economic institutions, 
but preponderance. 
At this point, it would be instructive to re-examine the 
Tucker quote with which this paper was begun in the context 
developed throughout this paper, changing the works "U.S." to 
-39-
.,Soviet," "capitalism., to "socialism," and 0 imperial" to 
"socialist": 
If the answer to [soviet] expansionism is not to be 
found in the objective forces generated by [socialism], 
it must be sought in the variety of motives that have 
always led preponderant powers to identify their pre-
ponderance with their security and, above all, perhaps, 
in the fear arising from the loss of preponderance itself. 
The belief that the loss of preponderance must result 
in a threat to the well-being of the collective, and 
this irrespective of the material benefits preponderance 
confers, is so constant a characteristic of [socialist] 
states that it may almost be considered to form a part 
of their natural history. 
A final conceptual problem may lie in the fact that the 
dominant capitalist powers tend to import agricultural products 
and raw materials while the USSR is primarily and exporter of 
such commodities. But again, the actual make-up of inter-
national trade is unimportant, for it merely depends on the 
particular needs of the dominant economy. Even the U.S. 
imports a lot of manufactured goods and is the world's largest 
exporter of food. Yet few would argue that the U.S. is not a 
dominant power in the international capitalist - §ystem. 
Much more remains to be done. The relations between the 
USSR and Eastern Europe must be examined in_greater detail, with 
special attention placed on isolating the ' true significance of 
East European dependency on the region's developmental alterna-
tives. 96 In particular, a study must be made of the terms of 
trade btween the USSR and Eastern Europe after 1965. Such a 
study would be valuable for several reasons. First, the cur-
rent literature is extremely vague on this point. Hhile terms 
of trade are alluded to by several authors, 97 it does not 
appear that any detailed study has been completed over the 
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entire period for all traded goods. Second, such a study would 
help crystalize the third phase of socialist dependency still 
further. It would attempt to replicate the studies cited 
. b t d h p d k' 98 earlier y Kut , Men ers ausen, ryor an Wszela i. Data 
would be needed on the per unit price of each unit imported or 
exported as well as the q~ant_i W · traded and the prevailing 
world prices for those goods traded. If the world price is 
significantly higher than the price the USSR pays for imports 
fr0m East, exploitation would be present. Likewise, if the 
USSR is able to obtain prices higher than those prevailing in 
the world market for its exports to the CMEA member countries, 
exploitation would also be occurring. The conclusions of such 
a study would offer a quantitative measure of exploitation 
within the CNEA by the Soviet Union or any other member country. 
A spectral analysis of the specific inta-CMEA trade flows, by 
type of goods traded, is especially suited for attempting to 
show how the USSR has restructured satellite economies thro_ugh 
changes in their specific imports and eArports over time. This 
analysis seems lacking in earlier studies and could potentially 
help document the true impact of Eastern Europe I s __ -dependency ·on 
the Soviet Union. The area of study should also be expanded to 
include Soviet relations with China, Cuba, and the Third Norld. 99 
This study is only considered a starting point for further re-
search and questioning of both traditional and not-so-traditional 
theories of international relations. Ultimately, it is a goal 
of this study to demonstrate that future research must not be 
clouded by ideological constraints and prejudices £ram either 
side. 
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